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SO YOU WANT TO MOVE TO THE SUBURBS:
POLICY FORMULATION AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL GROWTH-
RESTRICTING PLANS
By Richard D. Hoffman* and Campbell Killefer**
Introduction
Municipalities recently have begun to question the wisdom and
necessity of development-oriented land use policies. During the 1950's
and 1960's suburban and rural communities often pursued rapid-growth
policies that welcomed new residents and encouraged industrial and
commercial expansion. These communities hoped to achieve a bal-
ance whereby industry and commerce would provide both jobs for
residents and a tax base for the necessary expansion of public facilities.1
Changes in attitudes toward land-primarily recognition of land as a
finite resource possessing aesthetic values-in addition to economic
stagnation, and an influx of urban problems, however, generally have
reversed the priorities of-municipal land use policies. 2
Representative of these changing attitudes are such cities as
Ramapo, New York and Petaluma, California. Both cities entered the
1970's facing a rising demand for new residential housing. Fearful
that an influx of newcomers would overburden existing city facilities
and threaten self-perceived small town characteristics, both cities en-
acted sophisticated temporary land use regulations designed to curb
present rates of growth. In subsequent litigation these regulations
* Member, second year class.
** Member, second year class.
1. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Self-Determination: Must Local Control of Growth
Yield to Travel Rights?, 17 ARrz. L. REV. 145, 146 at n.7 (1975). Some of the simplest
methods of growth promotion include incorporation of cities and annexation of land.
The municipality simply makes more land available for development and hopes that
a proper mix of housing and industry will result. If insufficient industrial development
occurs fiscal problems arise. More residents are present but the anticipated job oppor-
tunities are lacking. Demand for municipal services increases but not the industrial tax
base to absorb these costs. Consequently municipal taxes rise at a rate unforeseen
during promulgation of the expansion plans.
2. Id. at 146-47. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALUES & J. BANTA, THE
TAKo Issu 3 (1973).
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were unsuccessfully attacked as violative of the state zoning laws and
the due process, equal protection, and commerce clauses of the Con-
stitution, and as beyond the auspices of the police power.3
This note probes the legitimacy of growth-restricting land use
policies such as those enacted by Ramapo and Petaluma. The central
issue is whether a city may impose temporary restrictions that directly
or indirectly limit its rate of expansion and ultimate population, or must
it accommodate the housing needs of those desiring to reside within its
borders. Accordingly, land use restrictions are analyzed from the per-
spective of the'cities, with an emphasis on municipal obligations that
arise from population pressures. Next discussed is the individual's per-
spective in land use planning, with a focus on the constitutional issues
of due process, equal protection, and the right to travel. Recent de-
cisions redefining standing are also examined to determine their effect
on land use litigation. The note then explores the correct balance be-
tween municipal and individual interests that often compete for devel-
opment of finite areas of land. After an analysis of the Ramapo and
Petaluma decisions, considerations for evaluating the legitimacy of
growth-restricting plans are proposed.
I. Land Use Policy Formulation
A. Authority to Enact Land Use Ordinances
Throughout history, governments and citizens have grappled over
the control and use of land. 4 In medieval England the King owned
land and granted possession to those whom he favored. Gradually
possession turned to ownership, subject to regulation by the sovereign.
The colonies adopted a similar posture but emphasized regulation for
the benefit of the community as a whole. As a fledgling nation, the
United States recognized that all freemen had the right to own and
possess land; in accord with common law principles, that right was sub-
ject to governmental regulation. Although governmental regulatory
policies were generally passive restraints on private uses arising from
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,5 the advent of the indus-
3. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
4. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAXING IssuE 53-104
(1973). Although an historical perspective is not a prerequisite to an understanding
of current land use problems, it does provide an insight into the nature of the problem,
the interests involved, and common policy underpinnings. Significantly, an historical
perspective permits one to recognize that some of the problems, policies, and rules con-
cerning the use of land date back to the Magna Carta.
5. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1968).
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trial revolution marked a change in attitudes. Mass industrialization,
development of large urban and commercial areas, and suburban ex-
pansion increased the need for land use policies that would permit tech-
nological advancements while still protecting the sanctity of the home.
Land use regulations in the form of municipal zoning therefore
met widespread acceptance as a means of protecting the suburbs from
rapid and unsettling changes in the urban scene while still permitting
industrial expansion. 6 Pioneer planners "undertook to cure the over-
crowding and arrest the blight [of the cities] through. a system of regu-
lation which established a hierarchy of uses, provided spaces for all
legal uses of land, and sought to separate incompatible uses."'7  Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." represented the institution of this
methodology into policy. Rather than relying on common law nuisance
doctrines, Euclid, Ohio, adopted an ordinance that established compre-
hensive building restrictions and divided the village into use districts
segregating industry from homes and commerce. The Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance, stating that zoning was a valid exercise of the
municipal police power unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare."9
Although Euclid, like most cities enacting zoning ordinances in
the 1920's, was primarily concerned with protecting the single-family
residence, the doctrine of Euclid was rapidly extended to encompass
and guide the entire realm of urban planning development.
Multiple-unit residences, housing many American families, also needed
to be insulated from commerce and industry. Health and safety de-
manded that commerce be protected from industry. Light industry
was distinguished from heavy industry. Soon a pattern of distinct,
although not necessarily coherent, gradations, termed zones or use dis-
tricts, was established. 10
6. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE ZONING
GAME].
7. Anderson, Introduction to Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 465 (1971). The power to institute such policies arises out of the police power.
See notes 23-46 and accompanying text infra.
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Id. at 395. Interestingly, the federal district court, in an opinion by Judge
Westenhaver, had held Euclid's plan unconstitutional, concluding: "The plain truth is
that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the property in an
undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a strait-jacket. The purpose to be accomplished
is really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In
the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate
them according to their income or situation in life." Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of
Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924). Thus the possibility of abuse in land use
regulation is not a new phenomenon.
10. See THm ZONING GAME, supra note 6, at 5. For a detailed discussion of zoning,
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The theoretical rigidity of zoning, however, has been ameliorated
by a variety of legislative enactments designed to provide flexibility in
the development of land. To protect the individual landowner who
experienced hardship from the system of districts, the variance was
introduced in the 1930's as a tool to permit an exception to the land
use scheme approved by Euclid." Although zones and districts
remained the norm, the guidelines were not strictly enforced. The
special use permit12 and the floating zone 3 granted broad discretionary
power to local zoning bodies. More recently, the planned unit
development 4 -providing for the mixture of uses, alteration of densities,
and control of open space-has highlighted the transformation of
zoning from a mild form of regulation to a complex, comprehensive,
and systematic proscription on the way we live.
Many would argue that an intricate system of regulation is appro-
priate, but problems arise because of the dearth of Supreme Court de-
cisions delineating the proper scope of zoning authority, and from the
multiplicity of dissimilar opinions emanating from jurisdictions acting
in the absence of such guidelines. Since 1926 the Court has directly
limited Euclid only by the Fifth Amendment's requirement of just com-
pensation for the taking of private property.' 5 Other limitations, orig-
see I R. ANDERsoN, AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING (1968) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING].
11. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 10. The origin of the variance
as a flexible land use tool comes from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which
described the variance as designed "[t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases such
variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,
where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordi-
nance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall
be observed and substantial justice done." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE
ENABLING AcT § 3 (1926).
12. The special use permit is a means to partially circumvent the strict designation
of zones. Upon discretionary approval by local administrative zoning bodies, certain
uses that would not otherwise be permitted within the zone are allowed. See THE
ZONING GAME, supra note 6, at 7.
13. "[The floating zone] differs from the traditional 'Euclidean' zone in that it
has no defined boundaries. . . . [It] is a special detailed use district of undetermined
location in which the proposed kind, size and form of structures must be preapproved.
It is legislatively predeemed compatible with the area in which it eventually locates if
specified standards are met and the particular application is not unreasonable." Sheri-
dan v. Planning Bd. of Stamford, 159 Conn. 1, 16, 266 A.2d 396, 404 (1969).
14. A planned unit development is an instrument of land use control that augments
existing master plans and zoning ordinances, and permits a mixture of land uses on the
same tract. Rudderow v. Township Comm. of Mount Laurel, 121 N.J. Super. 409, 297
A.2d 583 (1972). The California Court of Appeal described a planned unit develop-
ment as "a tract of land absolved from conventional zoning to permit clustering of
residential uses and perhaps compatible commercial and industrial uses, and permitting
structures of differing heights." Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors,
11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 772, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970).
15. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Viewed another way,
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inating in the state courts, have had minimal influence in providing uni-
form national standards. 6 The large degree of state and local autonomy
in zoning is not inherently dangerous and can be quite beneficial in pro-
viding local bodies the flexibility to determine local destinies. As a
result of the absence of doctrinal guidelines and objectives, however, the
zoning mechanism has become a dubious method for regulating the land
we live on.
The power of municipalities to zone remains much the same as
that enunciated in Euclid; the permissible purposes, however, have
changed. State enabling legislation typically grants municipalities the
power to restrict the use of land, delineating the main objectives and
purposes of zoning as follows:
[T7o lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic and other dangers; to promote health and the general wel-
fare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate
the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewage, schools,
parks and other public requirements.' 7
The constraints on a city's authority to restrict land use come from
both constitutional and statutory sources. The nation's long history of
personal liberty, as well as its material prosperity, stems largely from
the constitutional protections encouraging private ownership and de-
velopment of land and its resources. The Constitution guarantees that
"[njo person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.' 8  These broad constraints on govern-
ment action are further refined when applied to states: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."'" These four clauses of the Constitution-the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the just
Nectow is merely an extension of Euclid's ruling that regulation must be reasonable. In
Nectow, a regulation establishing an exclusive district, in which no practical use could
be made of the plaintiffs land, was held to be an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's
property.
16. See notes 57-74 and accompanying text infra.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT § 3
(1926). Some states go further and accord to the municipalities virtually unlimited
authority to zone. California's enabling legislation, for example, contains no specific
provisions that limit the permissible purposes of a zoning ordinance. Section 65850 of
the Government Code delineates the types of ordinances that a legislative body of any
city or county may use. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65850 (West 1976). Section 65800 ex-
presses the purpose as an "intention [by the legislature] to provide only a minimum of
limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control
over local zoning matters." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65800 (West 1976).
18. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
19. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
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compensation clause, and the equal protection clause-traditionally
operate as shields against government excesses in regulating privately
owned land.20  Excessive regulation is controlled by the doctrine of
inverse condemnation and the constitutional mandate of just compen-
sation. Thus, a property owner may recover damages for the injury
he suffers from excessive regulation. 2'
Traditionally, courts have deferred to the zoning determinations
of local governments. 22  This deference derives from the parallel scope
of municipalities' broad police and public welfare powers,23 from the
state constitutional structure of power providing that real property be
subject to local control,24 and from the persistent notion that actions
regarding land are inherently local in nature and primarily affect the
immediate area of the city. State statutory provisions impose only
slight limitations on the exercise of municipal zoning authority. Gener-
20. In Euclid, for example, the plaintiff alleged violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, arguing that the Village's use districts were "'unreason-
able and confiscatory." 272 U.S. at 386. One year later in Zahn v. Board of Pub.
Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927), the plaintiff augmented the due process attack with the
just compensation clause, again to no avail. A plaintiff finally prevailed on due process
grounds in Nectow y. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Plaintiffs unsuccess-
fully argued violation of both the due process clause and the just compensation clause
in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). Contemporary litigation involving land
use regulations, however, often utilizes a diverse, arsenal of constitutional guarantees,
including the four traditional clauses as well as the right of association, the right of
privacy, and the right to travel. For the most recent Supreme Court case involving this
multifaceted attack on zoning, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
See also Frame & Scorza, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property Rights, Personal
Rights, and the Liberal Regime, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975); Margolis, Ex-
clusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll?, 11 CALiF. WEST. L. RaV. 85
(1974).
21. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Candlestick
Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d
557, 571, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 905 (1970).
22. "The Supreme Court abandoned the supervision of zoning four decades ago."
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STrAN. L. RFv. 767, 783 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sager]. A more accurate expla-
nation of the dearth of Supreme Court cases dealing with zoning, even in the highly
charged Warren years of scrutiny into personal rights, may be that the justices saw
zoning as a particularly local endeavor in which the Court would only muddle. For
example, Justice Marshall in 1974 voted in dissent to invalidate an ordinance that re-
stricted land use to single family dwellings, thereby burdening the fundamental rights of
association and privacy between tenants. He nonetheless embraced the traditional Su-
preme Court attitude toward zoning: "I am in full agreement with the majority that
zoning is a complex and important function of the State. It may indeed be the most
essential function performed by local government, for it is one of the primary means by
which we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life. . . . Our
role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals." Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
24. See note 17 supra.
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ally these provisions permit municipalities to exercise broad, compre-
hensive control over local development, provided that the cities comply
with general plans.25 Once a city's zoning ordinances are brought into
compliance with the development policies embodied in its general plan,
the land use restrictions are rarely struck down.
B. Permissible Police Power Objectives of Land Use Ordinances
While enabling legislation and constitutional provisions delineate
the authority for municipal zoning, the scope of this authority is de-
pendent upon judicial interpretations of the breadth of the police
power. In an early description of the municipalities' police power to
zone, the California Supreme Court in Miller v. Board of Public
Works2" wrote:
[T]he police power is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elas-
tic and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief in
the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of expan-
sion to meet existing conditions of modem life and thereby keep
pace with the social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution
of the human race. In brief, "there is nothing known to the law
that keeps more in step with human progress than does the exercise
of this power."'27
Historically, municipalities have had the power to regulate reason-
ably the use of land for health, safety, and general welfare purposes.
Most litigation involving attacks on land use policies centers on the con-
struction of the terms "health," "safety," and "general welfare" in order
to determine the reasonableness of ordinances allegedly promoting
these ends.' The terms "health" and "safety" logically present
minimal interpretation difficulties. Separation of noxious uses, ade-
quate light and air provisions, regulations restricting population concen-
tration, and regulations requiring adequate recreational facilities and
open space fall within the ambit of zoning for the health of the com-
munity. Likewise, traffic control and building height limitations that
ensure adequate fire protection represent valid exercises of police
power in the promotion of safety. Even large lot size requirements
and stringent floor size regulations arguably promote health and safety
concerns. Although the relationship between the danger and the
remedy often is quite tenuous, a correlation exists between density and
health, and between congestion and safety. Statistics reveal an opti-
25. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65300, 65860(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
26. 195 Cal. 477 (1925).
27. id. at 485.
28. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 44 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S.
June 21, 1976); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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mum ratio of land space per person.2 9 Additionally, much of the crime
in the central cities has been attributed to crowded conditions and lack
of adequate recreational areas. 0The concept of general welfare, however, can present major inter-
pretation difficulties. General welfare is best defined in terms of in-
clusion and exclusion. It includes, inter alia, lot size and floor area
requirements, population density controls, and separated districts de-
signed to attain homogeneous zones of development. 3' Historically it
has excluded zoning for the purposes of preserving property values, 3 z
of reducing tax burdens, 33 or of promoting aesthetics.34 These objec-
tives, particularly the promotion of aesthetics, have received approval
only as incidental benefits arising from legislation that is justifiable on
"health" or "safety" grounds. Changed attitudes toward land, however,
have altered this historical conceptualization, and judicial decisions
have evidenced this change. In the early 1930's the Indiana Supreme
Court sounded the warning in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Indianapolis" by holding that general welfare was sufficiently broad
to include aesthetic concerns as an auxiliary consideration. Subsequent
state court decisions espoused similar beliefs.3 6 It was not until the
1950's, though, that a broad and powerful doctrine was enunciated.
In Berman v. Parker37 the Supreme Court was confronted with
the claim that urban renewal projects in the District of Columbia
violated the due process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth
Amendment in that property was being taken "merely to develop a
better balanced, more attractive community."3 8  The Court sustained
the project, refusing to limit the belief that public welfare may be en-
hanced by zoning regulations:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.39
29. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
30. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERs, REPORT (1968). Inade-
quate housing was among the factors listed as prominent causes of racial unrest. Id.
at 4.
31. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 10, at §§ 7.12-.33.
32. Id. § 7.29.
33. Id. § 7.31.
34. Id. §§ 7.12-.24.
35. 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
36. See generally 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF ZONING, supra note 10, at § 7.22.
37. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
38. Id. at 31.
39. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
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Although many state courts are still reluctant to construe general
welfare as broadly as Justice Douglas did in Berman, an increasing
number of jurisdictions are moving in that direction. In New York,
People v. Stover4" held that aesthetics were a valid subject of legislative
concern and that reasonable legislation designed to promote these ends
was a valid application of the city's police power. In Oregon City v.
Hartke,4' the Oregon Supreme Court upheld total exclusion of a
"junkyard" from a municipality, basing its decision on aesthetics. Cal-
ifornia, as well, has extended the concept of general welfare to include
aesthetics, defining the term broadly to include preservation of prop-
erty values, maintenance of tax revenues, retention of economic sta-
bility, and promotion of a pleasant community.4 2
Greater appreciation of the inherent values of land, rising concern
about our environment, and powerful lobbying groups have been signi-
ficant factors in expanding the scope of general welfare. And despite
periods of economic depression and high unemployment, municipalities
are enacting, and courts are sustaining, legislation that primarily seeks
to preserve environmental and aesthetic values. New techniques of
zoning designed to reconcile the need for orderly municipal growth
with social and economic desires represent the continued viability
of a broader conceptualization of the general welfare. Variation within
zones, planned unit developments, conditional use permits, variances,
and density transfers allow uses to be mixed instead of strictly sep-
arated.43 Subdivision exactions permit benefits to be derived from
developers who otherwise might heedlessly overburden the city and
then leave.44 Preferential tax assessments are designed to preserve
open spaces.4 5 Increased intergovernmental cooperation and the crea-
40. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S.
42 (1963).
41. 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
42. See generally D. HAGMAN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTCE §§ 5.16-.20 (Supp.
1975); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH (1975) (a land-
mark three volume work on land use planning).
43. See notes 11-14 supra.
44. The California Supreme Court upheld dedications of land from a developer to
a city as a condition of approval for a lot subdivision under the Subdivision Map Act,
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66410-499.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1976), in Ayers v. City Council
of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). The state court more recently af-
firmed land dedication exactions of park land in Associated Home Builders, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
45. California provides tax benefits to owners who desire to devote their land to
either agricultural or open space uses. The land is taxed at its actual value rather
than its speculative value, thereby relieving a tax burden on undeveloped land that other-
wise would tend to encourage subdivision. California Land Conservation Act of 1965
(Williamson Act), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-95 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) and CAL.
Rlv. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-32 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
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tion of regional planning agencies both indicate that land is increasingly
viewed as a commodity and a finite resource. 48
Still, each municipality perceives differently the factors that are
significant in achieving the balance between development and preser-
vation interests. While expanding the permissible objectives to be at-
tained by land use regulations, judicial decisions continue to treat each
municipality as the repository of the general welfare. General welfare
is still largely equated with municipal interests. The result is that
municipalities may enact land use regulations for a variety of purposes
while remaining responsible only to those individuals residing within
their borders. General welfare, then, is broad as to purposes but nar-
row as to obligations.
C. General Welfare Within the Context of Municipal Obligations
Commentators have suggested that general welfare should be ex-
panded to reflect the effects of local legislative action in an "interde-
pendent metropolitan society."4  Recognizing that strong home rule
traditions would resist such a change, some activist courts are gradually
imposing more stringent requirements on municipalities whose actions
are inconsistent with the larger area affected by their policies. The
most striking manifestation of this changing conceptualization of the
breadth of zoning authority has occurred within the realm of municipal
obligations to house new residents.
Historically, municipalities were entities physically isolated from
each other and owing obligations only -to their present inhabitants.
They were communities in the true sense of the word-geographically
and fiscally independent, and often culturally homogeneous. Zoning
was one of the means used to preserve these attributes.48 Such munici-
pal status however, was shortlived. Advances in transportation and
communication rendered suburban communities less isolated. Open
46. The California Government and Public Resources Codes provide for compre-
hensive regional planning agencies in addition to municipal land use control. E.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65060-85 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (regional land use and transporta-
tion planning); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 22000-80 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (Ventura-
Los Angeles Mountain and Coastal Study Commission); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-
61 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Com-
mission); CAL. Gov'T CODE §H 66801, 67000-130 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency); CAL. PUB. REs. CODE H3 27000-650 (West Cum. Supp.
1976) (California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission). Of particular importance
for the greater San Francisco Bay Area, of which Petaluma is a part, is the Association
of Bay Area Governments, a federation of local governments that has instituted broad
planning directions for the area, but has no legislative authority to implement the poli-
cies.
47. Tim ZONING GAME, supra note 6, at 176.
48. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
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growth policies allowed municipalities to expand their borders and
annex neighboring land. Seeking to broaden their tax base, communi-
ties promoted industrial and commercial development. Thus many
municipalities are no longer self-contained units but rather are interde-
pendent entities deriving benefits from neighboring cities and imposing
policies that affect those beyond their borders. 49 In this light, the issue
becomes whether municipalities whose basic foundations have been
largely altered owe greater responsibilities to those beyond their borders.
While the answer is not yet definitive, a pattern is emerging.
For purposes of analysis, two broad types of municipalities are
considered: those that remain unitary housing markets, physically and
socially isolated from the expanding urban setting; and those that,
although politically independent, are mere extensions of a larger
housing market.
1. Unitary Housing Markets
Unitary housing markets have little responsibility to those beyond
their borders. They experience little or no population pressure and
their policies have minimal impact outside municipal limits. They do
not borrow size from nor are they part of a larger metropolitan region.
The concept of the public welfare, construed narrowly or broadly, pro-
vides ample justification for sustaining local legislation designed to pre-
serve small town character and rural environments in nonmetropolitan
communities.
Exemplary of an analysis that imposes minimal obligations on
nonurban communities are Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'0 and
Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills.5 In Belle Terre the Supreme
Court sustained an ordinance restricting land use to single family dwel-
lings, thus ensuring that the population of the village would remain at
approximately 700. Although the ordinance was attacked as violative
of the constitutional rights of association, privacy, and travel, within the
49. This concept, characterized as "borrowed size," occurs when a "small city or
metropolitan area exhibits some of the characteristics of a larger one if it is near other
population concentrations. A statistical measure called population potential, which
measures the accessibility from a given location to other centers of population, behaves
very much like population in statistical analysis. For instance, per capita income in a
place is as strongly associated with this measure as with its actual population. This
makes sense if one considers that the essential reason why income and population levels
are associated is that population is a rough index of the number of opportunities for
interaction available in that place. . . . In simple terms, while [smaller areas] retain
many of the advantages of smaller size, such as lower levels of congestion, they enjoy
the advantages of larger size through their easy access to other centers." Alonso, Urban
Zero Population Growth, DAEDELUS 191, 200 (Fall, 1973).
50. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
51. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
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context of a small, rural community the restrictions were deemed
reasonable exercises of police power. 52  In Los Altos Hills the ques-
tioned regulation provided a minimum lot size of one acre. Los Altos
Hills, California, like Belle Terre, New York, is a town relatively un-
pressured by the problems of urban development. Therefore, even
though the regulation limited growth and promoted environmental
preservation, it served a legitimate governmental interest without
creating an appreciable impact beyond the town's borders.5 3
Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills are not, however, representative
of a large number of American municipalities in the 1970's. While all
cities desire "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted," 54 many have opted for industrial expansion
and urbanization. Others have merely been drawn into a situation in
which they are borrowing size and deriving benefits from neighboring
municipalities. These cities are not the secluded retreats protected by
Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills, but rather represent the communities
described by Justice Hall in his dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester55 as
falsely assuming that they possess an "almost boundless freedom . . .
to erect exclusionary walls on their boundaries, according to local whim
or selfish desire, and to use the zoning power for aims beyond [their]
legitimate purposes."5 6 These municipalities, which experience pop-
ulation pressures, derive social and economic benefits from their neigh-
bors, and pursue policies affecting those neighbors, should have their
land use regulations evaluated pursuant to a standard of general
welfare different from that used for more isolated communities.
2. Municipalities with Population Pressures
The ability and inclination of each zoning entity to designate its
desired objectives, and to enact ordinances to achieve those ends
regardless of the social realities that surround it, have led an increasing
number of courts to redefine the breadth of the general welfare.
Whereas municipalities experiencing minimal population pressures can
legitimately claim that their borders enclose the area to which they are
obligated, municipalities on the urban fringe cannot as easily assert this
claim. The latter directly benefit from the social and municipal ser-
vices that neighboring communities provide; logically they owe a con-
comitant duty to provide their fair share of these services. Recognizing
that city or county borders are frequently mere artificial designations
52. 416 U.S. at 9.
53. 503 F.2d at 254.
54. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
55. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
56. Id. at 252, 181 A.2d at 140.
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that do not necessarily represent the true sphere of the community,
some courts are viewing land use regulations in a broader context,
encompassing the area that will in fact be affected by the legislation
in question.
Redefining the obligations of a municipality involves due process
considerations. California, for example, has extended the due process
guarantees of adequate notice and hearing to property owners who live
outside a municipality, holding that nonresident land owners have
standing to challenge zoning ordinances that adversely affect their
land.57 Thus municipal boundaries have been expanded to provide a
forum for all individuals who may foreseeably be aggrieved by -a local
ordinance.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court significantly expanded the
obligations that metropolitan communities must incur in National Land
& Investment Co. v. Kohn,58 which invalidated an -ordinance that zoned
for minimum lot sizes of four acres. The township claimed, inter alia,
that strained city services necessitated a low density and that it had no
responsibility to accommodate "those who are pressing for admittance
to the township unless such admittance will not create any additional
burdens upon government functions and services."59 Thus, any increase
in population would, in effect, have to pay for itself. As to the first
claim, -the court found that city services were not in fact overburdened.
Rejecting -the second argument, the court spoke in broad terms of the
township's obligation to assume its share of the development pressures
that surrounded it:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live.
We have concluded not. 60
The court would not condone the exclusion of segments of the general
population merely because the city refused to extend facilities to meet
a future demand; zoning could not be used "to avoid the increased re-
sponsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth
invariably bring. '" 61
The doctrine that a city owes certain obligations to its region has
57. E.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1972); see Note, Judicial Limitations on Parochialism in Municipal Land
Use Decisions: Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 25 HAsNGs L.J. 739 (1974).
58. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
59. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in another
case made clear its intent: "If expansion is required, then it should be accomplished."
Delaware County Community College Appeal, 435 Pa. 264, 270, 254 A.2d 641, 644
(1969).
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been extended in Pennsylvania into what might be called a regional-
fair share approach to resolution of challenges to exclusionary ordi-
nances. 62  Parochial legislation that purposefully or inadvertently
creates "an effective barrier to socioeconomic dispersion throughout
[an] entire region"63 will be subject to judicial analysis as to whether
the municipality has failed to absorb its fair share of regional needs
and whether alternative methods of accommodation are available. 64
The test to a certain extent merely balances the equities. Since mu-
nicipal services must be provided somewhere, suburban communities
cannot escape their fair share of the burden. The contention that
general welfare stops at each municipal boundary or does not encom-
pass the housing needs of those outside its borders is rejected, and the
court imposes upon municipalities the obligation to broaden their
perspectives when dealing with the right of people to live on land.
Such a regional conceptualization of land use policies is consistent
with the prevailing view that development plans should take into
consideration specified economic and social data and should seek to
regulate physical expansion. 5 Whereas traditional developmental ap-
proaches concentrated on the proper long term location and intensity
of activities that use land and on the accommodation of facilities serving
these activities, contemporary planners view municipalities as societal
systems in which land use plans seeking solely to regulate physical
development are not sufficient. 6
The strongest application of the regional-fair share approach has
been made in New Jersey, where regional conceptualization had
previously been employed to sustain local legislative zoning determi-
nations. 67 The seminal case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel6 s involved the housing obligations of all
New Jersey cities not yet completely developed and in the path of
inevitable future growth. Mount Laurel was such a city-a natural
area for growth, subject to population pressure, and on the urban
62. See Willistown Township v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453,
300 A.2d 107 (1973); Appeal of Kit Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970);
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
63. Comment, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 347, 348
(1970).
64. See National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
65. See I. Heyman, Commentary on Article 3 of A Model Land Development
Code, ALl Proposed Official Draft No. 1, at 128-30 (1974).
66. Id. See H. FRANKUN & D. FALK, IN-ZoNiNo (1974).
67. See Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347 (1949). See generally Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land Use Parochialism
-Toward a ludicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Feiler].
68. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
[Vol. 3
Summer 19761 MUNICIPAL GROWTH-RESTRICTING PLANS
fringe. Ostensibly in an effort to attract industry and thereby keep
taxes low, thirty percent of the township was noncumulatively zoned
for industrial use only. A myriad of sophisticated techniques effec-
tively made the remainder of the township exclusively single-family
residential." The township contended that although exclusionary, its
"policies and practices [were] in the best present and future fiscal
interest of [its] inhabitants and [were] legally permissible and justi-
fied." 70
The New Jersey Supreme Court traced the regional approach it
had attributed to the meaning of general welfare and concluded that
every municipality in the path of inevitable growth must affirmatively
make "realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety
and choice of housing" at least to the extent of "'the municipality's fair
share of the present and prospective regional need therefore.' ",T Al-
though zoning power had been delegated by the state to the local
governments, state constitutional considerations required that when local
regulations had a "substantial external impact," the welfare of those
state citizens beyond the local borders must be "recognized and served."72
In answer to the city's contention that it owed the duty of fiscal responsi-
bility to its present inhabitants, the court emphasized that munici-
palities must zone "primarily for the living welfare of people and not
for the benefit of the local tax rate."7
69. The zoning ordinance provided for the following: (1) 29.2% of all land
was zoned for industry of light manufacturing, research, distribution of goods, and of-
fices. Less than 1% was actually occupied by industrial uses. (2) 1.2% was zoned for
retail business. (3) The balance was zoned for residential uses in the following manner:
(a) 33% was allotted to R-1, which required a minimum of 9,375 square feet and a
floor area of 1,100 square feet. These requirements would realistically allow only
middle income dwellings; this district was approximately 80% developed. (b) 1% was
R-2, which required 11,000 square feet minimum lot size and 900 square. feet floor
area, and which was completely occupied. (c) 50% was R-3, which required 20,000
square foot lots and 1,100 square foot dwelling floor areas. Additionally there were
planned unit developments providing for mixtures of uses and a residential zone of
clustered dwellings. These latter two categories, however, were designed to accommo-
date only upper-income families without children. Approval of developments sharply
limited the number of bedrooms and required the developer to pay school tuition and
costs. Thus, Mount Laurel had "acted affirmatively to control development and to'
attract a selective type of growth and that through its zoning ordinances has exhibited
economic discrimination in that the poor have been deprived of adequate housing and
the opportunity to secure the construction of subsidized housing, and has used . . .
resources solely for the betterment of middle and upper income persons." Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
70. Id. at 161, 336 A.2d at 718.
71. Id. at 188, 336 A.2d at 731.
72. Id. at 189 n.22, 336 A.2d at 732-33 n.22.
73. Id. at 188, 336 A.2d at 732. This language resembles that used by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court when dealing with the exclusion of new residents. See notes
59-65 and accompanying text supra.
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The New Jersey courts, then, will consider the location of the
municipality, existing external pressures, and the present permitted
mix of uses. Any facial showing that the municipality has not fulfilled
its regional obligations will eradicate any presumption of validity and
will impose upon the municipality the burden of establishing supersed-
ing reasons for its action and inaction."4 This test is fair inasmuch
as the municipality has access to information used to promulgate its
land use measures and, therefore, should be able to show the reason-
ableness of any policy. Theoretically, only a fair share of regional
needs need be absorbed. Inasmuch as already developed commu-
nities are not affected by the decision, developing communities may be
required to absorb more than their fair share.75
D. Judicial Remedies
The question of adequate remedies for municipal exclusion of
potential residents has haunted the courts, both state and federal. The
usual court order leaves open the city's options after the court declares
the existing land use provisions unconstitutional. Courts have rarely
required a city to formulate comprehensive new housing plans to be
approved by the court. In Mount Laurel the trial court's order requir-
ing such a plan was reversed as a premature and excessive exercise
of the court's equity power.76
The Supreme Court, however, has restricted the municipal free-
dom to formulate future land use policies when either racial or econom-
ic imbalances are apparent. Hills v. Gautreaux77 upheld a federal
74. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). Although the court could not
require regional planning, it strongly urged it as a concomitant to its decision. More-
over, given the court's definition of general welfare and its recognition of cities' obliga-
tions to absorb all uses of land to accommodate their fair share of regional needs, inter-
municipal cooperation would be quite difficult to avoid.
75. The concurring opinion of Justice Pashman in Mount Laurel suggests a
remedy for this problem. He stated that the approach of the judiciary in relation to
municipal fair-share obligations should be a four step process: "(1) identify the relevant
region; (2) determine the present and future housing needs of the region; (3) allocate
these needs among the various municipalities in the region; and (4) shape a suitable
remedial order." Id. at 215-16, 336 A.2d at 747 (Pashman, J., concurring). He further
stated that developed suburban municipalities, "which have availed themselves of the
land use controls permitted by statute and which have not provided sufficient opportu-
nities for development of low and moderate income housing to meet their fair share
of regional needs, have both a negative obligation not to use zoning and subdivision
controls to obstruct the construction of such housing and an affirmative duty to plan
and provide for such housing insofar as these obligations can be carried out without
grossly disturbing existing neighborhoods." Id. at 217-18, 336 A.2d at 748 (Pashman, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 151, 336 A.2d 713.
77. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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court order compelling the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), in cooperation with the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA), to implement a remedial housing plan in the Chicago metro-
politan area to cure past racial discrimination in the construction and
leasing of public housing. HUD had argued that Milliken v. Bradley78
precluded a federal court remedy beyond the city boundaries of Chi-
cago, but the Court in Gautreaux distinguished Milliken, stating:
The critical distinction between HUD and the suburban school
districts in Milliken is that HUD has been found to have violated
the Constitution. . . . [U]nlike the desegregation 'remedy found
erroneous in Milliken, a judicial order directing relief beyond the
boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail coercion of
uninvolved governmental units, because both CHA and HUD have
the authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits. 79
Gautreaux, then, appears to serve notice that federal courts may look
beyond municipal boundaries when fashioning remedies for housing
discrimination that involves the federal government. The broad involve-
ment of HUD and other federal agencies in helping to finance local
housing developments increases the potential impact of Gautreaux on
land use regulations.
While a regional planning perspective gives the judiciary more
power to invalidate suspect plans, it would do so only in the absence
of inter-municipal cooperation. Even an activist role would probably
be largely abandoned if regional planning were instituted. 0 Decisions
such as Mount Laurel and Gautreaux may warn the boroughs and
townships of the country that their long-standing authority to determine
their own destinies will be considerably restricted unless they plan in
cooperation with, rather than in derogation of, neighboring commu-
nities.
II. Equal Protection
Litigants challenging exclusionary zoning policies generally rely on
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.8" Equal protection claims are usually adjudicated on
78. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken held that absent a showing of racial segrega-
tion in suburban school districts surrounding Detroit, the federal district court could
not order an interdistrict school busing plan to achieve integration.
79. 425 U.S. 284, 297-98 (1976). Since the Supreme Court decision, HUD has
agreed to subsidize housing in white suburbs of Chicago for 400 minority families. The
subsidies are the first step in what is expected to be a court-approved comprehensive plan
to remedy the many years of discrimination in federally-funded public housing. Wall St.
J., June 8, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (Pac. Coast ed.).
80. See generally THF, ZONING GAME, supra note 6, at 166-85.
81. See generally Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusion-
ary Land Use Controls, 22 SvRAcuSm L REv. 509 (1971); Feiler, supra note 67; Sager,
supra note 22; Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645
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one of two standards developed by the Supreme Court.8" Traditionally
the Court has applied a rationality test, focusing the inquiry on
whether a rational relationship exists between a legislative classification
and a permissible state objective. Under this test the party challenging
the legislation must show that it is arbitrary or unreasonable, with vir-
tually no possible grounds of justification. Failure to bear this burden
results in the court upholding the legislation without necessarily ap-
proving the methods employed. If legislation creates a constitutionally
suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental interest, however, it is
subject to a more demanding review. Under this "strict scrutiny" test,
the Court will invalidate the legislation unless there is a clear showing
that any burdens imposed are necessary to protect compelling and sub-
stantial governmental interests that cannot be protected by less onerous
methods.83 Determination of the standard to be applied is generally
conclusive. A constitutional dichotomy has emerged:
The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situa-
tions evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny
that was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the
deferential "old" equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny
in theory and virtually. none in fact.84
The absence of cases in which the party bearing the burden has pre-
vailed indicates that the compelling state interest burden weighs heavily.8"
The courts usually apply the reasonableness standard in land use
litigation because of the presumption of validity attached to zoning
ordinances. The vitality of equal protection challenges in land use
adjudication depends, therefore, on whether the opposed legislation can
be shown to create a suspect classification or to abridge a fundamental
interest.8 6 While many land use regulations have been invalidated
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Zoning]; Note, The Equal Protection Clause
and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
82. Equal protection analysis was greatly affected in the late 1940's by an article
that introduced a substantive aspect into traditional equal protection. Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rnv. 341 (1949). See generally
Sager, supra note 22; Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 81.
83. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HA v. L. RaV.
1065 (1969).
84. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L REv. 1, 8 (1972). Since Chief
Justice Warren's retirement, the Court has in some instances altered equal protection
analysis by applying an intermediate test that focuses on the relationship between the
permissible objectives of legislation and the reasonableness of the means to achieve the
objectives. E.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5139 (U.S. June 29, 1976); Wein-
berger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. Although Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is an exception
to the statement in the text, the emergency situation during World War II probably best
explains the result.
86. E.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974);
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under equal protection standards, they have generally involved racial
classifications; independent grounds for invalidation have not been ex-
plicitly recognized. Thus, reliance on equal protection in land use
cases is in reality a search for a suspect classification or a fundamental
interest. The most promising possibilities would be the judicial recog-
nition of wealth as a suspect classification or housing as a fundamental
interest.
A. Wealth as a Suspect Classification
Zoning ordinances such as those requiring a minimum lot size
or floor size raise the cost of housing and therefore serve to limit poor
peoples' access to housing. Further, such ordinances frequently serve
to preclude the poor from living near their sources of employment.
Cufiulatively such ordinances may operate to exclude the poor from
entire regions.87 Thus, such statutes might be attacked on the ground
that they unfairly discriminate against the poor.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held wealth to
be a suspect classification, it has intimated in a few cases that it would
extend strict scrutiny protection to classifications based on wealth. For
example, in Douglas v. California,"8 the Court held that indigent
criminal defendants are entitled to counsel at public expense for a first
appeal. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners," while
holding that unsentenced defendants awaiting trial were not consti-
tutionally entitled to absentee ballots, stated that wealth was a factor
"which would independently render a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."9  While the
Court in these cases was primarily interested in protecting the substan-
tive and procedural rights of criminal defendants, ability to pay was one
of the factors considered by the Court. Thus, the Court seems to indi-
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organizations v. City of Union City, 424
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
87. For a discussion of the phenomenon of exclusionary zoning in relation to low
income groups, see Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The
Beginning of the End, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning
and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040 (1963); Cutler, Legal and Illegal
Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv.
370; Feiler, supra note 67; Sager, supra note 22; Walsh, Are Local Zoning Bodies Re-
quired by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs?, 3 CONN. L. REV. 244 (1971);
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 81; Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a
Castle?, 69 MicHI. L. REv. 339 (1970).
88. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
89. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
90. Id. at 807.
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cate that it will subject a classification based on wealth to strict scru-
tiny if that classification is incidental to a favored interest.91
Certain characteristics of poverty make it difficult to apply strict
scrutiny to classifications based on wealth. Although the effects of
wealth discrimination are often as pervasive and injurious as those of
racial discrimination, the differences have been considered significant
enough to justify disparate judicial treatment. Unlike race, poverty is
regarded as a temporary circumstance, remediable over time. Addition-
ally, the poor are not easily distinguishable as a class; whereas members
of a particular race are usually readily identifiable, there are varying
degrees of poverty. Finally, classifications based on wealth are accept-
ed in our society as normal and natural. 92 These characteristics of
poverty do not however, compel the conclusion that "burdens on the
poor are less invidious than those placed on blacks"93 or other racial
minorities. First, present social realities demonstrate that poverty does
not generally prove to be remediable; rather, it is a continuous cycle
from which few escape. Education and employment are necessary to
remove the constraints of poverty, yet neither can be obtained without
financial resources. Second, while the poor might not be as distinct
a class as racial minorities, this is no reason to avoid dealing with clear
cases of discrimination based on wealth. Finally, racial classifications
were at one time in our history accepted as normal and natural; just
as that attitude has been discredited, so can be the acceptance of wealth
based classifications. Racial classifications usually prompt immediate
and intense judicial scrutiny. Wealth classifications that perpetuate
the burdens of poverty could logically be adjudicated with the same
degree of scrutiny.
B. Housing as a Fundamental Interest
Various commentators have posited that equal access to housing
may be worthy of status as a fundamental interest.94  Adequate dwel-
lings may be as important as voting and other fundamental rights. The
Warren Court, taking note of contemporary social and economic
91. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), in
which the Supreme Court prohibited the use of state imposed poll taxes because they
disproportionately infringed the poor's fundamental right to vote. Ability to pay was
significant because the discrimination involving the right to vote primarily affected the
less wealthy. Similarly, where welfare recipients were required to attain one year's
residency in the District of Columbia before applying for any benefits, it was the consti-
tutionally protected right to travel, in addition to the fact that the prospective recipients
were poor, that ultimately called for the application of strict scrutiny. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
92. Sager, supra note 22, at 786.
93. Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 81, at 1660.
94. See note 81 supra.
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priorities, intimated that equal access to housing was a fundamental
right. In Shelley v. Kraemer" the Court invalidated racially restrictive
covenants enforced by state courts, declaring that among the civil rights
intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the
Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own, and dis-
pose of property. Later, Reitman v. Mulkey96 invalidated an amend-
ment to California's constitution that would have protected property
owners' rights to discriminate when selling land. Aside from the racial
implications, Reitman intimated that urban housing may be. associated
with the public interest. a7 Many observers hoped that despite the racial
aspects of these cases, the contention that "[e]qual access to housing . . .
is regarded by the court as a matter of the most serious social and con-
stitutional concern' 9"1 would prevail even absent an obviously suspect
classification.
Two decisions of the present Court, however, indicate an unwil-
lingness to recognize a right to housing. In James v. Valtierra,9 9 the
Court upheld a state requirement of local referendum approval of any
public housing projects, notwithstanding affirmative federal housing legis-
lation. Because there was no evidence of racial classification the
legislation was within the constitutional bounds of acceptable state ac-
tion. More recently, Lindsey v. Normet'00 explicitly concluded that
housing per se is not a fundamental interest. Justice White noted that
"the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill."''
Thus, it seems unlikely that claims based either on classifications
of wealth or on impediments to housing access will prompt strict
scrutiny by the courts. This is not to say, however, that courts will not
give preferential treatment to these claims when they are made in con-
junction with claims based on other constitutionally protected interests.
The continued vitality of the right to travel indicates that quite the op-
posite may be true.
MI. The Right to Travel and Zoning
As early as 1823 the existence of what is now a fundamental right
to travel was judicially acknowledged.10 2  Its source has variously been
95. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
96. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
97. Id. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring).
98. Sager, supra note 22, at 790.
99. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
100. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
101. Id. at 74.
102. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Frederick
Jackson Turner, in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (1920), provides a colorful
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attributed to the commerce clause,10 3 the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV,'04 the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 10 and the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.'0 Its existence, however, is now be-
yond question.
The nature of the right is the ability to move, migrate, and settle
in any state, because "[wie are all citizens of the United States; and, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and re-
pass through every part of it without interruption.' ' 0 7  State actions
that unreasonably burden those exercising the right to travel-actions
that seek to "isolate [a state] from difficulties common to all of them
by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its
borders"' 0S8-will be struck down under strict judicial scrutiny.
A. Development of the Right
The right to travel has two doctrinal aspects: The recognition
that a federal system must guarantee free travel between the states,
and the protection of migration and travel as fundamental personal
interests. The first aspect dictates that state action discriminating
against the movement of citizens between the states cannot be toler-
ated.' Similarly, attempts by states to isolate themselves from the
burdens which all must bear run counter to the underlying concepts
analysis of American infatuation with moving on. Historians. sociologists, and the
courts "[a]ll have agreed that the right exists." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
759 (1966). Americans appear to be moving about with fervor. A mobility survey
conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department
of Commerce indicates that roughly 20% of all families moved once during the year
ending October, 1973. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 11, 1975. at 18, col. 1. This
note does not focus on a detailed analysis of the right to travel, but merely examines
its application to land use doctrines that affect a city's authority to restrict growth.
For a more complete analysis of the right to travel, which increasingly appears in liti-
gation, see Z. CIAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956);
Note, Municipal Self-Determtination: Must Local Control of Growth Yield to Travel
Rights? 17 ARiz. L. REv. 145 (1975); Note, The Right to Travel and Exclusionary
Zoning, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 849 (1975); Note, The Right to Trai el: Another Constitu-
tional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972); Note,
Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975).
103. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
104. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
105. E.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
106. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
107. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting),
quoted with approval in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
108. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
109. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (relying on the
privileges and immunities clause).
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of a federal union.110 Without the ability to enter neighboring states
and to carry on the activities fundamental to national interests, the in-
dependent state rivalries existing during our early history would again
flourish. Due to the national aspects of citizenship, the traveler is
accorded protection from state action, but only to the extent necessary
to promulgate national unity."' When national interests are minimal,
or state interests significant, the protection accorded travelers does not
need to be as great. In effect, then, the assertion of the right to travel
derives from a balance of national interests against state interests." 12
The individual benefits only as a result of the interests inherent in
federalism. The second aspect of the right to travel arose later in our
history, but is much more significant for purposes of land use cases.
Whereas concerns for national solidarity marked the first half of
of our history, rising concern for the rights of the individual has evolved
during the second half." 3  Now, protection of the right to travel
largely arises not from a national interest in unity but rather from the
national interests in the individual. Inasmuch as it has been judicially
determined that the right to travel is a fundamental interest, infringement
of the right prompts the court's strict scrutiny and requires a compelling
governmental interest to uphold the restriction. ' 4
These two aspects of the right to travel create a constitutional
protection of interstate migration with perhaps a concomitant right to
move intrastate."15 This broad formulation has been refined, however,
110. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
111. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), where the Court
characterized the right to travel as national in scope and as owing its "existence to the
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 79.
112. See, e.g., Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1900) (holding that if the
incidence of travel is only remotely affected, the state's interests will generally prevail).
113. See Note, Municipal Self-Determination: Must Local Control of Growth Yield
to Travel Rights?, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 145, 148-54 (1975).
114. The primary significance of this approach is that it accords litigants attacking
exclusionary zoning policies the opportunity to have their cases judged on the merits
rather than virtually denying access to the courts with presumptions of validity.
115. The dictum of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958), the first of the
Passport Cases, illustrates the reasoning for according intrastate travel constitutional
protection: "Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside fron-
tiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country,
may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual
as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in
our scheme of values." Justice Douglas' concurrence in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 255 (1964), stated: "The right of any person to travel interstate irrespective of
race, creed, or color is protected by the Constitution'. Certainly [a citizen's] right to
travel intrastate is as basic." Id. (citation omitted). A footnote in Memorial Hos-
pital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 n.9 (1974), recognized the inconsistency
of protecting interstate travel while disregarding intrastate travel simply because of a
political boundary existing in one and not in the other. Lower federal and state court
decisions dealing with welfare programs, housing, and education have all recognized
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by a string of residency requirement cases that apply a test of searching
for a penalty on the right to travel in legislative action. The Supreme
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson116 stated: "[1]n moving from State to
State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a consti-
tutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exer-
cise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional." 117 Federal courts have ap-
plied strict scrutiny to residency requirements abridging both the right to
travel and other substantial individual interests such as voting," health
care, 1 9 welfare benefits, 20 and equal access to federal housing pro-
jects. 2 1  The rationality test of the equal protection doctrine has been
applied in other situations to actions infringing upon interests perceived
as relatively less important-airplane travel, 22 state tuition reduc-
tions,2 3 divorce, 4 and eligibility for state election candidacy. 25
Justices Douglas and Rehnquist have concluded that the penalty
analysis is excessively burdensome for any state to carry. The two
justices suggested in their respective concurring and dissenting opinions
in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County2 6 that a restraint on travel
that is merely "incidental and remote" rather than a "real and purpose-
ful barrier" to movement should not be struck down as long as the
state can come forward with persuasive reasons for the enactment.' 27
The "purposeful barrier" criterion now appears to have been approved
protection for intrastate travel where state legislation discriminates against recent resi-
dents (who are usually poor or are members of an ethnic minority). King v. New
Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 863 (1971); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147 (D. Del. 1972); Jose-
phine County School Dist. No. 7 v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n, 15 Ore. App. 185,
515 P.2d 431, 437 (1973).
116. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
117. Id. at 634.
118. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
119. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
120. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
121. Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st
Cir. 1970). Similar results were reached in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
122. Evansville-Vandenburgh Airport v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
123. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234
(D. Minn. 1970), aff d mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273
Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
124. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
125. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802
(1973). The residence requirement was upheld despite the strong federal policy against
such requirements for federal elections, as expressed in the 1970 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973a-bb (1970), amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973
(1965), which were approved in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
126. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
127. Id. at 270-76 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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in Sosna v. Iowa,1 8 which upheld Iowa's residency requirement for
obtaining a divorce, emphasizing the fact that the state statute did not
irreversibly foreclose the plaintiff from obtaining a divorce.' 29 The
opinion thus utilized the rationality test rather than strict scrutiny.
The Court appears, then, to be backing away from its right to
travel penalty analysis to focus on two additional questions: what
personal interests are being penalized, and upon whom do the restric-
tions fall most heavily? The rationale approaches the "spectrum of
standards" under equal protection analysis identified by Justice Marshall
in his San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez dissent.'
The right to travel cases present no clear continuum of judicial attitude.
Courts appear to assess almost intuitively the impact of travel restric-
tions while measuring the social value attached to the affected activity.
Restrictions that harshly affect the poor and racial minorities prompt a
tougher review not necessarily because of the right to travel analysis
but very likely because the Court is protective of those categories of
people. The potential for invoking the strict scrutiny of the courts,
however, makes the right to travel an innovative legal tool to be tested
on municipal restrictions.
B. The Right to Travel and Land Use Controls
The right to travel includes migration between states, and most
likely within a state, but its application in the choice of regional area,
specific city, and precise housing development is open to question.
Moreover, municipalities relying on their delegated zoning authority
arguably may impose restrictions on the number and kind of people
moving within their borders. Open-growth advobates would contend
that no restrictions are permissible. Municipal residency requirements
for civil servants, however, have generally been upheld despite right
to travel attacks.' 3' Additionally, state land use controls requiring
128. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
129. Id. at 406.
130. "I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach
to equal protection analysis. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal
protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate stand-
ard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the
field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what
this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly
comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize par-
ticular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn." 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
131. The California Supreme Court dispensed with a broad conceptualization of the
right to travel in Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal.
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development permits under the interim power of the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission withstood right to travel arguments,
which a California court stated had no support in law or reason.'32
Housing has been recognized as a sufficient personal and national
interest to invalidate residency restrictions on eligibility of federal low-
income housing projects. 3 ' These cases, however, involved existing
housing developments from which people were excluded rather than
the construction of new projects to accommodate individuals from out-
side the area. Presently the federal courts do not appear to recognize
a right to occupy housing or an interest of people to "live on land,"
as found by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in National Land & In-
vestment Co. v. Kohn.134  The degree of judicial scrutiny of housing
as a individual interest should fluctuate according to the population
pressures on municipalities to accommodate new residents. Small
towns enjoy the absence of growth demands, whereas municipalities
such as Mount Laurel and Petaluma experience the accelerating needs
of people for housing outside the urban cores. The Supreme Court
has heard the right to travel argument applied only to a town with
minimal growth pressures in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas;35 it
utilized the purposeful barrier analysis to dispense quickly with the
right to travel attack by saying the ordinance "is not aimed at transi-
ents."136 The right to 'ravel argument found no judicial acceptance and
stirred no strict scrutiny within the zoning context of Belle Terre.
Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974), a case involving a residency re-
quirement imposed on municipal workers as a condition of employment. The plaintiff
desired to live outside the city while maintaining his municipal employment in Torrance,
California. The court recognized a greater municipal interest in employing its own
residents than the employee's desire to travel, that is, a right to commute. The United
States Supreme Court upheld a residency requirement for city employees in McCarthy
v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 44 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. March 22, 1976), and
has since denied petitions for writs of certiorari in two cases involving residency require-
ments for civil servants in Youngstown, Ohio and Lansing, Michigan. Hunter v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 44 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. March 22, 1976); Park v. Lansing
School District, 44 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. March 29, 1976). The short opinion in
McCarthy focused on the city's interest in continuing residency as a requirement for city
employment rather than residency as a threshold criterion for new employees. The
lower federal courts in these cases did not apply strict scrutiny to municipal employee
residency requirements.
132. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974). "We fail to see how the Coastal Initiative interferes
with the fundamental right to travel. It is not discriminatory; it imposes no durational
residence requirement; it exacts no penalty for exercising the right to travel or to select
one's place of residence. In short, it has no chilling effect on an individual's freedom of
movement." Id. at 332, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
133. See note 121 supra.
134. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
135. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
136. Id. at 7. Even the vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall did not mention the
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Explicit growth restrictions can overtly accomplish what tradition-
al zoning attempted covertly to achieve. Restriction of residential land
use to single family dwellings obviously limits the number of people
who can move to the community. Yet both Belle Terre and Ybarra
v. Town of Los Altos Hills.3 upheld such restrictions as valid tools in
preserving a town's quiet rural atmosphere. Neither of the towns,
however, experienced population pressures sufficient to compel a
stricter scrutiny of their land use restrictions. Cities that are alarmed
by a growth rate far exceeding that of the state or region may desire
to place restrictions, not permanent barriers, on the number of incom-
ing people. These restrictions do not irreversibly foreclose oppor-
tunity for housing or other sustenance, as did the restrictions in Shapiro
v. Thompson. 3 "
The right to travel analysis, however, may be abused when applied
to municipal ordinances that restrict growth in a nondiscriminatory,
balanced manner. The California Supreme Court warned against the
excessive use of right to travel arguments:
The critical question whether a legislative act is to 'be denied
the presumption of validity and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny
does not turn on the ingenuity of counsel in conceiving remotely
possible ways in which the act might affect those rights. 139
The right to travel, therefore, is not generally applicable to land use
regulations. Until a fundamental right to housing is judicially recog-
nized, reasonable restrictions on the rate of municipal growth do not
violate a federal interest in free movement between the states; nor do
they infringe a personal interest in migration.
IV. Standing In Land Use Litigation
If a category of persons can assert that its exclusion from a com-
munity is unlawful on the theory of land use discrimination or infringe-
ment of the right to travel, it must nevertheless demonstrate that it is
comprised of the proper litigants to raise the issue. Courts have recently
words travel or migration, but instead focused on First Amendment rights of association
and privacy to urge striking down the town's so-called "Hippie Ordinance." Justice
Marshall joined the majority in according deference to land controls, even those aimed
at "restricting uncontrolled growth." Id. at 13. For two articles suggesting that Belle
Terre rested on First Amendment foundations rather than on the constitutional dimen-
sions of zoning, see Frame & Scorza, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property Rights,
Personal Rights, anzd the Liberal Regime, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975), and
Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll?, 11 CAL. WEST. L.
REv. 85 (1974).
137. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
138. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
139. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 136, 514 P.2d 433, 437, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 853 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
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made this threshold question of standing an extremely restrictive concept
in land use cases.14 °
The Supreme Court confirmed the restrictive trend in land use liti-
gation concepts of standing in Warth v. Seldin.'4' The jury require-
ment for standing includes a component of causation and the plaintiff
is required to allege injury and the exact manner in which the city's
land use restrictions causes the alleged harm. The Court held that low-
income and minority group plaintiffs in Warth did not meet the stand-
ard of identifiable injuries from the municipality's land use restrictions.
The relatively simple statement of the Court's holding belied its signif-
icance:
We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating
that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.1 42
The strongly-worded dissent by Justice Brennan accused the
Court of utilizing standing as an excessively high barrier to reach the
merits, saying that the majority's opinion "tosses out of court almost
every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity
claimed to be unconstitutional, [and] can be explained only by an in-
defensible hostility to the claim on the merits.' 43
Standing to sue in federal courts emanates from Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution, which limits the judicial power to Cases
and Controversies. The plaintiff must at least allege that some identi-
fiable statutory or constitutional protection has been abridged, and that
he is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated. . .. ,,144 Derivative standing arises from the relationship between
the plaintiff and those people actually injured, but their relationship must
insure identical presentation of the issues.'" Identical presentation of
140. Without probing the present morass of law surrounding the issue of standing,
it is sufficient to note that the courts have further obfuscated an already confusing and
difficult field of the law. The traditional standing components are well set out in
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See generally Scott, Standing in
the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973).
141. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test,
3 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 485 (1976).
142. Id. at 508.
143. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970).
145. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). This case is something of an
anomaly in that it allowed the organization to assert violations of the personal rights of
its members. The substantial reputation of the NAACP as an advocate of black peoples'
rights perhaps can explain this exception to the usually rigid standing criteria. Justice
Douglas's spirited dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US. 727 (1972), urged that
inanimate natural objects receive court-appointed guardians ad litem for purposes of
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issues rarely arises because courts prefer to deal with the actual parties
allegedly injured by the defendant.
State court requirements for standing are generally more lenient.
The preeminent and successful state exclusionary zoning attacks involved
particularized allegations of housing deprivation. The cases also
rested, however, on an initial receptivity of the courts to the charges
of exclusionary zoning. The prophetic language of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court eleven years ago in National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn'46 typified the growing concern in the state courts toward abuses
of land use planning:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables
them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and grow-
ing communities. It must not and can not be used by those offi-
cials as an instrument by which they shirk their responsibilities.
Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the
future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future.147
Standing is a logical component of any judicial system that prefers
to deal with real cases and controversies rather than with generalized
claims concerning unidentified people. Allegations of infringement of
countless unnamed persons' right to travel due to a municipal zoning
ordinance involve greater standing problems than does the more con-
crete assertion of exclusion from a community because of unreasonably
large minimum lot sizes. In either situation, however, the plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts to show an unconstitutional abuse of the
zoning authority by a community.
V. Balancing the Competing Interests In Development
The previous sections analyzed the municipal interest in
maintaining a pleasant community through local control of development,
which often competes with the individual interests of free migration
and access to decent housing. The municipal obligation to house new
residents should largely be, but rarely is, determined by the population
pressures for development. All these factors should be balanced in
the land use planning process.
An inherent component of our system of government is that the judi-
satisfying the standing requirement for litigation. Id. at 741-52. See Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
450 (1972). Plaintiffs amassed comprehensive data that successfully demonstrated the
discriminatory effects of municipal zoning ordinances in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). Such well-documented attacks in the state courts should be
compared to the relatively less successful cases in federal courts, represented by Warth,
notes 141-43 and accompanying text supra.
146. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
147. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
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ciary is not an overseer of all functions of government, but an equal
branch with designated functions. Standing requirements manifest a
judicial reluctance to deal with all conceivable cases and controversies;
likewise the existence of elected legislative bodies, whose function is
to promulgate social and economic policies ostensibly for the public in-
terest, limits the ability of courts to intervene in every worthy cause.
Therefore, courts presume the validity of legislative enactments; they
look at the reasonableness and constitutionality of the legislation only
as a check on, usurpation of power by the legislature. The subjective
wisdom of the enactment is left ultimately to the people who elect their
representatives. 148
Recognition of a presumption of validity is particularly important
for those individuals who seek to invalidate a zoning regulation that
is accorded the presumption; the courts will defer to the legislative
judgment unless those people challenging the ordinance rebut the pre-
sumption by showing its arbitrary or unreasonable nature. The diffi-
culty is that not all legislative actions take into consideration all of the
factors from which the presumption of validity arises; different levels
of legislative action represent different levels of legislative competency.140
Incumbent upon legislators, advocates, and judges is the need to
distinguish between presumptions accorded to state legislative enact-
ments and those attaching to local legislation. 1 0
Most courts, however, continue to rely on a presumption of vali-
dity when dealing with local land use regulations and consequently
defer to the legislative judgment. Legislative acts are not easily invalid-
ated because it is assumed that the legislative body studiously weighs
and balances the merits of a proposal before adoption. While such
an assumption is probably well-founded in the case of federal or state
legislatures, it is not as valid in connection with local legislative action.
Municipalities are often homogeneous entities whose elected bodies rep-
resent one dominant viewpoint. Other municipalities, though diverse
in composition, do not require elected officials to represent a given dis-
trict. Thus, divergent perspectives are not necessarily represented.
Moreover, in many cities and towns public service is only a part-time
job, and elected officials can devote neither the time nor the effort
necessary to consider alternative policies adequately. The presump-
tion of validity is therefore less applicable to local legislative actions
than to state legislative action.
148. Cf. THE ZONING GAME, supra note 6, at 104-05, 107.
149. Id.
150. This problem is somewhat ameliorated when an administrative body such as a
planning board or commission prescribes the policy. Administrative action is not in-
sulated from judicial inquiry by the separation of powers doctrine which protects legis-
lative acts. Consequently, the courts can pursue a more detailed study of the underlying
motives and justifications behind a given policy. Cf. id. at 104-06.
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Some jurisdictions appear to recognize the dissimilar nature of
state and local legislative action and to erode the presumption more
readily when dealing with municipal enactments. Infringement by the
municipality of a so-called preferred institution can result in a shifting
of the burden to the municipality to show the reasonableness of its leg-
islation. When certain uses are recognized as favored, courts have eradi-
cated the presumption of validity, shifted the burden of going forward
onto the municipality, or even shifted the burden of proof of reason-
ableness to the zoning municipality. 151
Such logic was employed in Bristow v. City of Woodhaven' 52 to
invalidate an ordinance that allowed mobile home courts only by special
permit and then limited them to seventy-five sites per court. In invali-
dating the ordinance the court reiterated the familiar presumption of
validity, but recognized that due to the nature of the use such a stand-
ard was inappropriate. The court proposed a general rule:
[W]here it is shown that local zoning exists at odds with the general
public welfare rather than in furtherance of it, there can be no pre-
sumed validity attaching to that portion . which conflicts with
the public interest.' 53
The effect is that by reason of the favored status of the use, the pro-
ponent of such use need only establish a prima facie case.15 4  The pre-
sumption fades and the burden shifts to the municipality to justify its
regulation.
A similar result was reached in Pennsylvania in Exton Quar-
ries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.'5 The issue was the
validity of an ordinance that prohibited the quarrying of rock within
the township. The court held that total prohibition requires a "more
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare."' 5 6 Although ordinarily presumed valid, the municipal police
151. Feiler, supra note 67, at 689.
152. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
153. Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324.
154. A prima facie case is defined as "' one which is established by sufficient evi-
dence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side."'
Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 461, 208 N.W.2d 243, 248
(1973). This becomes particularly significant in light of the most recent Supreme Court
pronouncement on standing, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). If standing requires
merely that those injured in fact be properly identified with sufficient data showing
their injury, the standing issue will not present a major stumbling block to exclusionary
zoning litigation. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See notes 68-74
and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has intimated more is required,
however. Such a standard, if true, may exclude many litigants in this field from the
federal courts. See notes 140-47 and accompanying text supra.
155. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
156. Id. at 60, 228 A.2d at 179.
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power "'does not extend to an arbitrary, unnecessary or unreasonable
intermeddling with . . .property, even though such acts be labeled for
the preservation of health, safety and general welfare.' ,,17
The basic premise is that occasionally local interests must succumb
to a broader, state defined conceptualization of the general welfare. In
Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Township of Paris""5 it was in the
public interest to encourage manufacturing and mining, which was pro-
tected despite the allegation that the proposed uses would be injurious
to residential purposes. Similarly Board of Zoning Appeals v. Jehov-
ah's Witnesses'15 protected houses of worship, balancing the welfare
and safety of the residents of the neighborhood against the right to free-
dom of worship and assembly.
The existence of a favored use creates an obligation for the courts
to assess the relevant factors, balancing general public interests and
considerations against local community concerns to determine whether
a broader interest is adversely affected. If the municipality demon-
strates to the court the necessity for the proposed regulation and that
it expresses the interests of general public policy, the regulation will
remain in effect. However, if the municipality has merely enacted the
ordinance in question under the general guise of promoting the general
welfare without offering the requisite evidence to support such a con-
clusion, the ordinance will no longer be clothed in a presumption of
validity.160
VI. Sequential and Numerical Limitations
On Municipal Growth
A. Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo
In Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo 6' a sequential growth
ordinance of the Township of Ramapo met with judicial approval, the
court holding that "where it is clear that the existing physical and fi-
nancial resources of the community are inadequate to furnish the essen-
tial services and facilities which a substantial increase in population re-
quires, there is a rational basis for 'phased growth.' "162 Situated ap-
157. Id. at 58, 228 A.2d at 178.
158. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958).
159. 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
160. The viability of the preferred status concept has been eroded somewhat by the
recent case of Kropf v. City of -Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179
(1974), where the court used a rebuttable presumption test. Id. at 155-56, 215 N.W.2d
at 186. Active judicial review, however, still thrives. Tocco v. Atlas Township, 55
Mich. App. 160, 222 N.W.2d 264 (1974).
161. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
162. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
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proximately thirty miles northwest of New York City, and "experiencing
the pressures of an increase in population and the ancillary problem
of providing municipal facilities and services,' 163 Ramapo adopted an
eighteen year capital budget improvement program subjecting residen-
tial development to the availability of public services. Those desiring
to develop land for residential purposes were required to obtain a
special permit, which issued only on the accumulation of a minimum
number of developmental points. Points were issued based on the avail-
ability of five essential services: (1) sewers; (2) drainage facilities; (3)
improved public parks or recreational facilities, including schools; (4)
public roads; and (5) firehouses.' 64 A landowner had the choice, in
obtaining the necessary points, of providing services at his own expense
or waiting for the township to provide the services. The program in-
sured that all landowners would accumulate sufficient developmental
points for special permit issuance within eighteen years.' 65 The plan
163. Id. at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
164. The ordinance provided the following standards for special permit issuance:
Points
(1) Sewers(a) Public Sewers 5
(b) Package Sewage Plants 5
(c) County approved septic tanks 3
(d) all others 0(2) Drainage: Percentage of Required
Drainage Capacity Available(a) 100% or more 5
(b) 90% to 99.9% 4(c) 80% to 89.9% 3
(d) 65% to 79.9% 2(e) 50% to 64.9% 1
(f) less than 50% 0
(3) Improved Public Park or Recreational Facility
Including Public School Site
(a) Within Y4 mile 5(b) Within mile 3(c) Within 1 mile 1
(d) Further than 1 mile 0
(4) State, County or Town Major, Secondary, or Collector
Roads Improved with Curbs and Sidewalks
(a) Direct Access 5
(b) Within % mile 3
(c) Within 1 mile 1(d) Further than 1 mile 0
(5) Fire House
(a) Within 1 mile 3(b) Within 2 miles 1(c) Further than 2 miles 0
Fifteen developmental points were needed for special permit issuance.
RAMAPO, N.Y., TOWN LAW §§ 261, 263.
165. 30 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 285 N.E.2d at 301-03, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53. The
initial six year period was governed by a capital budget in order to provide for maximum
orderly, adequate and economical provision of transportation, water, sewage, drainage,
parks and recreation, schools, municipal facilities and structures, and other public re-
quirements. The remaining twelve years were governed by a capital plan delineating
two general orders of priority for facilities to be provided in years 7-12 and those to
be provided during years 13-18.
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resulted from an exhaustive study of the "existing land rses" and of
other factors pertinent to municipal planning, and proposed a capital
improvements program for the purpose of eliminating "premature sub-
division and urban sprawl." '166
In reversing a lower court ruling that the plan was unconstitutional
and exclusionary, 167 the Court of Appeals of New York noted that New
York law did not proscribe sequential controls. Although regional
planning would be a "salutory" solution, phased growth was "well with-
in the ambit of existing enabling legislation."'6 8  With respect to the
exclusionary contentions, the court noted that all land use regulations
to some degree circumscribe natural growth, but that where manifest
developmental problems exist, a community's good faith efforts to con-
front those problems in an orderly, rational manner will not readily be
subjected to judicial invalidation. 169
Undoubtedly the court was persuaded by some of the tangential
aspects of the Ramapo plan as well as by the apparent incapacity to
handle growth. The plan was viewed as temporary: within eighteen
years special permits would issue to all,' 70 and this date would be ad-
vanced for the landowner who supplied facilities. 171  Additionally,
variances could be issued upon application. 7  Finally, preferential
tax treatment would be provided in the form of reduced value assess-
ments for those parcels of land unable to be presently developed.'17
166. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143. "The plan's preparation*
included a four-volume study of the existing land uses, public facilities, transportation,
industry and commerce, housing needs and projected population trends." Id. at 366,
285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
167. 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1971), rev'd, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
168. 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The dissenters,
however, could find neither statutory nor constitutional authorization to impose a mora-
torium on growth. Relying on the "settled doctrine that a municipality has only those
powers . . . delegated or necessarily implied," and on the exclusionary effects of such
parochial land use policies, the dissenters would have affirmed the lower court. Id.
at 383-93, 285 N.E.2d at 305-11, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156-65 (Breitel, J., dissenting in an
opinion joined by Jasen, J.).
169. Id. at 374-78, 285 N.E.2d at 298-302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148-52.
170. However, this would not necessarily be due to the capital improvement program.
See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
171. See note 165 supra. The cash outlay necessary to supply such facilities, how-
ever, would undoubtedly be exhorbitant.
172. 30 N.Y.2d at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Variances are
theoretically reserved for cases involving special circumstances. Historically, variances
have been granted with little or no showing of hardship. See, e.g., Allen v. Humboldt
County Board of Supervisors, 241 Cal. App. 2d 158, 50 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1966). But see
Topango Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1974). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West 1975), for the statutory determination
of when variances should issue.
173. 30 N.Y.2d at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155-56. Most lands
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Left unresolved by the decision were the justifications for certain
features of the plan and for its overall relation to proper police power
objectives. Specifically, the five developmental criteria are somewhat
arbitrary, especially if already developed parcels of land within the
town do not meet the minimum point requirement. 174  The asserted
physical need for sequential growth is somewhat minimized by the auto-
matic qualification of all property for special permit issuance after
eighteen years regardless of the actual existence of facilities otherwise
necessary to accumulate points.'7 5 Moreover, the provision that partic-
ular landowners can supply facilities to attain the minimum develop-
mental points may be unrealistic given the already high cost of building
a residence.' 7 6  Finally, the exclusionary aspects of the plan are not
as minimal as the court intimates. While it is true that all zoning reg-
ulations to some extent circumscribe growth, not all do so as severely
as those in Ramapo. Furthermore, many are related to health and
safety concerns and accordingly are less vulnerable to judicial invalida-
tion than those based on general welfare.'
Essentially, the Ramapo court refused to expand the obligations
imposed on municipalities enacting ordinances under the guise of the
general welfare. Insofar as most communities on the urban fringe ex-
perience Ramapo-like problems, all would have credible arguments for
instituting similar ordinances. Natural population forces could be
restricted from an increasingly large area. The court recognized the
exclusionary dangers of "community efforts at immunization or exclu-
sion" and emphasized that exclusionary plans "under any guise" would
not be countenanced.' 78  The court, however, was constrained to
resolve the issues according to largely antiquated conceptions of zoning
as a purely local governmental function. It seems highly improbable
are taxed at their full developmental value. To avoid contentions that they are taking
land without just compensation, municipalities and states occasionally reduce their tax
assessments when development potential is restricted. See, e.g., California Land Con-
servation Act of 1965 (Williamson Act), CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51200-95 (West Cum.
Supp. 1976) and CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §§ 421-32 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
174. Additionally, the Ramapo plan applies only to residential uses. Industry
generates the same problems and often in larger proportions; however, due to the tax
benefits that accrue to the city from industry, that growth is not phased. In the end,
such phased growth policies may be merely sophisticated fiscal zoning techniques.
175. See notes 164-65 supra.
176. This aspect of the plan is similar to land exactions and dedications. However,
municipalities can exact fees from developers only in proportion to the development's
future needs and to the present burden on existing facilities. Developers cannot be
required to pay for services that for the most part benefit the city at large and permit
the city to avoid its responsibilities. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
878 (1971). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 66477, 66479 (West 1976).
177. See notes 17-46 and accompanying text supra.
178. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
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that a court constrained to view the general welfare so narrowly could
impose sanctions on municipalities pursuing policies in accordance with
such a judicial determination. Since such policies are often exclusion-
ary only in effect rather than in purpose, the municipality is merely
zoning for the general welfare and judicial approval must follow.
The merits of sequential growth are not at issue; rather the issue
is the proper role of the judiciary when confronted with such policies.
Adjudication pursuant to traditional standards can lead to form taking
precedence over substance, alleged purpose over-shadowing apparent
effect. While in fact Ramapo's plan might be appropriate for its par-
ticular situation, other municipalities should be made to realize that this
plan is not a panacea for the ills of all developing communities. Not
only must "communities confront the challenge of population growth
with open doors,"'1 79 they must not close the door in the same motion
with innovation plans based on somewhat arbitrary and unrealistic
criteria.
B. Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma
The growth-restricting plan adopted by Petaluma presented issues
similar to those raised by the Ramapo plan. Situated approximately
forty miles north of the Golden Gate Bridge, Petaluma for many years
was a rural community physically isolated from the large urban areas
of San Francisco to the south and Oakland to the southeast. Major
transportation improvements in the late 1950's mitigated the physical
isolation and Petaluma actively sought to expand. In 1962 the city's
general plan projected a population increase from 17,000 to 77,000 by
1985.11° Subsequent development proved this long-term population
projection essentially correct although not in the balanced manner orig-
inally envisioned. Most of the new residential development was tract
housing constructed in the eastern portion of the city and represented
a serious threat to the small town characteristics of Petaluma. Addi-
tionally, a rising demand for housing resulted in an increase in applica-
tions for and approval of residential construction. As a result of
these development patterns, the inhabitants of Petaluma became dis-
enchanted with unrestricted growth.'8 '
179. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153. See, e.g., National Land
& Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See notes 58-76 and
accompanying text supra.
180. There appears to be considerable confusion, both in the court proceedings and
the voluminous literature concerning the case, regarding the area encompassed by the
1962 Master Plan. The 62 square miles upon which the population projections were
based represents an area eight times as large as the existing city, well beyond the chal-
lenged plan's urban extension line. Under revised projections, by 1990 55,000 residents
would be housed in less than one-half the area protected by the 1962 Master Plan.
181. The rapid construction of dwellings east of the freeway was, according to the
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In late 1970 and early 1971 the planning commission and city
council held meetings resulting in resolutions that established morato-
riums on rezoning of land within the city and on annexation of land
surrounding the city. Soon thereafter, in response to a questionnaire
and public hearings, the inhabitants strongly indicated that they favored
a significantly slower rate of growth. In rapid succession came a series
of resolutions delineating the official developmental policy of the city
and the means to implement that policy.'8 2
The plan established five important planning components: (1)
Environmental Design Plans; (2) Petaluma Housing Element; (3)
Residential Development System and an administrative Board; (4) an
allocation of approximately 500 residental units (restricted to subdivi-
sions of five or more units) per year over the five years of the plan's
operation; and (5) an urban extension line beyond which the city
would refuse to annex land or to connect utilities. Building permits
would be allocated only once a year, at which time subdivision con-
tractors would compete with one another to offer housing that best met
the city's development criteria.183 Permits would be granted to balance
future construction between single family homes and multi-family dwell-
ings and to spread the growth both east and west of the freeway. Also
adopted was a policy that eight to twelve percent of future residential
units would be constructed for low and moderate income people.18 4
The overall purpose was stated by one of the resolutions: "In order
city planning director, "splitting the city into two camps---'them' and 'us.' To add to
this sociological division, almost 75% of the households east of the freeway were living
in Petaluma, yet commuting to work outside the city." F. B. Gray, Rationale, Opera-
tion, and Evaluation of Residential Development Control in the City of Petaluma, Cali-
fornia, at 14.
182. Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 5760 N.C.S., Adopting a Development Policy for
the City of Petaluma, June 7, 1971; Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6008 N.C.S., Adopting
the Environmental Design Plan and Text, March 27, 1972; Petaluma Cal., Resolution
6028 N.C.S., Policy Respecting Residential Construction and Population Growth and
Reaffirming the Cessation of the Zoning Moratorium, April 17, 1972; Petaluma, Cal.,
Resolution 6113 N.C.S., Establishing a Residential Development Control System, August
21, 1972; and Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6126 N.C.S., Modifying the General Plan By
Adding Thereto a Housing Element, September 5, 1972. Copies of these resolutions
and accompanying analysis by Petaluma city officials are on file in the offices of the
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY.
183. Competition was basically in three stages. The first involved application to a
"residential evaluation board" that rejected or accepted proposals on the basis of their
conformity with the city's general plan and its environmental design plan. The latter
two stages were as follows: (1) thirty points were assigned for sewer mains, drainage
channels, fire protection, streets, and schools. Twenty-five points were required for
issuance of a permit. (2) eighty points were allocated for design excellence, open space
and trail links, inclusion of low cost housing, and necessary public facilities. Fifty points
were required in this group.
184. Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6126 N.C.S., Modifying the General Plan by Adding
Thereto a Housing Element, September 5, 1972; Petaluma Housing Element at 18-19.
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to protect its small town character and surrounding open spaces, it
shall be the Policy of the City to control its future rate and distribution
of growth.' 85
The plan sought to ensure that "development in the next five
years would take place in a reasonable, orderly, attractive manner,
rather than in a completely haphazard and unattractive manner."'86
More substantial problems existed, however. City planners doubted
the ability of public services to keep pace with population increases.
The quality of municipal services generally suffers, and at a relatively
higher per capita expense, when a city's growth rate is high.' 87 Further-
more, the inherent time lag in the planning process hampers the efforts
of local officials to respond to influxes of new residents. While eventu-
ally the city would have had to deal with these issues, the continuous
spiral of growth that Petaluma was experiencing brought these
problems to the point of confrontation much sooner than was antici-
pated.
1. Litigation in the District Court
The Petaluma plan was attacked by the Construction Industry
Association of Sonoma County and by landowners both inside and out-
side the city as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
amendment, the commerce clause, and the right to travel. In a lengthy
and detailed decision the federal district court held that the plan vio-
lated the fundamental right to travel insofar as it restricted natural
population growth of the area.'88
185. Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 5760 N.C.S., Adopting a Development Policy for
the City of Petaluma, June 7, 1971.
186. Petaluma, California Environmental Design Plans, Introduction at 1 (adopted
by Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6008 N.C.S., March 27, 1972).
187. "Economic studies have demonstrated for example, that per capita outlays
for education, police, administration and highways increase significantly with higher
growth rates; the more rapid the growth rate the more likely it will lead to a decrease
in quality of a majority of urban services. Brief for California Attorney General as
Amicus Curiae at 53-54,, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(1975) (citations omitted). For more extensive data on municipal services as affected
by growth, see CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELAkTIONS, LOCAL AGENCY
FORMATION COMMISSIONS (California State Printing Office 1971): 1 URBAN LAND INSTI-
TUTE, MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROwTH (1975); REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORPORA-
TION, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL; ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS AT THE URBAN FRINGE (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office, 1974).
188. Construction Indus., Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974). "Since the population limitation policies . . . are not supported by any com-
pelling governmental interest the exclusionary aspects of the 'Petaluma Plan' . . . are
hereby declared in violation of the right to travel and, hence, are unconstitutional." Id.
at 586.
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The logic of the decision was premised on the diverse sociological,
demographic, and economic data presented by the plaintiffs showing
the plan's adverse effect upon the availability of housing within both
the city and a wider region. The court focused on a market demand
analysis, 8" which theoretically embodies the interaction of free market
forces affecting purchasers of new homes, and found that Petaluma's
unilateral restrictions on housing to an average of 500 subdivision units
per year for five years would exclude approximately one-third to one-
half of the population projected by a demographic and market demand
analysis of the 1970-1971 period. 90 Rather than accommodating its
fair share of the regional market for new homes, Petaluma's plan
actually threatened to encourage a region-wide attempt to control city
growth artifically. Consequently, the court stated:
If such growth centers curtail residential growth to less than demo-
graphic and market rates, as has been attempted in the present case,
serious and damaging dislocation will occur in the housing market,
the commerce it represents, and in the travel and settlement of
people in need and in search of housing.191
Application of the right to travel flowed easily from the court's determi-
nation that the Petaluma plan excluded substantial numbers of
potential residents. Application of the right to travel invoked the
courts strict scrutiny. 9 2  The court routinely dismissed the city's
belated allegations of sewage treatment inadequacies and water supply
problems, 193 and boldly held that a municipality capable of supporting
a natural population expansion may not limit its growth simply because
it prefers not to grow at the rate that would be dictated by prevailing
market demand.
In determining that the Petaluma plan impermissibly infringed
the right to travel the district court relied heavily on the series
of exclusionary zoning cases from Pennsylvania that recognized a
personal right of people to live on land.'94 Most importantly, the court
adopted the posture of the Pennsylvania courts that a zoning ordinance
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in
189. The market factors of the price of land and constructed homes, proximity to
work areas, degree of choice in the quality of homes, availability of financing, reputation
of schools, and the highly subjective "city atmosphere" apparently coalesced within
Petaluma to create a desirable community in which people sought to purchase new
homes.
190. 375 F. Supp. at 576.
191. Id. at 579.
192. "Inasmuch as there is no meaningful distinction between a law which 'penal-
izes' the exercise of a right and one which denies it altogether, it is clear that the
growth limitation under attack may be defended only insofar as it furthers a compelling
state interest." 375 F. Supp. at 582 (citation omitted).
193. See note 204 and accompanying text infra.
194. See notes 58-66 and accompanying text supra.
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order to avoid future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon the
administration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid. 9 '
Thus, despite the rule that a federal district court must apply substan-
tive state law,196 and despite the prior Supreme Court determination
that housing was not a fundamental interest,'97 the Petaluma plan was
ruled unconstitutional.
2. Appeal
Notwithstanding the conclusiveness of the detailed findings of
fact, the district court's decision was reversed. 98 The court of appeals
agreed that the plaintiffs could show injury in fact in relation to their
due process argument. The allegation that plaintiffs suffered mone-
tary damages as a result of the restricted construction of housing
presented a personal injury and easily fell within traditional standing
criteria. The allegation that the plan violated the right to travel of un-
named third parties, however, was an assertion of injuries not personal
to the plaintiffs. Their standing to assert the right to travel argument
was derivative, allegedly arising out of a close relationship between the
plaintiffs and those people excluded from Petaluma. Under the rela-
tively stringent requirements for standing via association, 199 the court
of appeals held that there was "no special, on-going relationship be-
tween appellees and those whose rights allegedly are violated. 20 0  The
association could show no persuasive nexus between its activities in
constructing housing and the identities, whereabouts, or description of
classes of people likely to purchase future dwellings in Petaluma. While
the doors of the federal courts would be open to plaintiffs who could
allege exclusion from Petaluma and denial of housing, the Con-
195. "[W]e find the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court persuasive and
sound. . . . A zoning regulation which has as its purpose the exclusion of additional
residents in any degree is not a compelling governmental interest, nor is it one within
the public welfare." 375 F. Supp. at 586.
196. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). A federal district court sit-
ting in California should apply California substantive law, which has not heretofore
adhered to the fair-share, regional philosophy. It is not surprising, then, that the appel-
late court reversed. To have done otherwise would also have entailed ignoring the
recent Supreme Court decision on standing in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
as well as questioning the Ninth Circuit's own position on legitimate purposes of the
police power. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). As
a matter of tactics, it might have been wiser for the plaintiffs to have initiated their suit
in the state courts with an eye toward changing the substantive law. However, had
they pursued this course they might not have had as strong an argument concerning
the right to travel. See CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comn'n, 43
Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
197. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
198. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
199. See notes 140-43 and accompanying text supra.
200. 522 F.2d at 904.
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struction Industry Association could not vicariously represent the inter-
ests of those people. Without the critical ingredient of standing, the
court would not entertain the right to travel argument, and because the
Petaluma plaintiffs had relied exclusively on this argument on appeal,
they could not then raise arguments in order to show injury and
standing.
Even had the plaintiffs demonstrated standing, the court of ap-
peals intimated that the right to travel was inapplicable to the Petaluma
plan. Noting the Supreme Court's rejection of the right to travel argu-
ment in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas2 0 as not penalizing transients,
the court of appeals stated in a footnote "the Petaluma Plan is not
aimed at transients, nor did it penalize those who have recently exer-
cised their right to travel."'202 Consequently the court concluded that
"the concept of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold
Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces
and low density of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate
pace. '20 3  Restricting uncontrolled growth thus became another per-
missible objective of municipal zoning ordinances, and traditional de-
ference to localities was again upheld.
3. Analysis of Unresolved Issues
On nearly every major controversy raised by the Petaluma
litigation the two court opinions either diverge on theory or confront
different issues. For example, the district court easily found that the
plaintiffs had standing to assert the right to travel of third parties, and
thereby reached the merits of the allegation to find that the plan vio-
lated the right of people to travel and settle; whereas the court of ap-
peals not only concluded that plaintiffs had no standing, but strongly
suggested that even if standing existed, the right to travel was inappli-
cable to the plan's restrictions. Moreover, the district court failed to
rule on the due process and commerce clause arguments, yet the court
of appeals in the interest of judicial economy decided both of these
unnecessary issues in Petaluma's favor. The district court employed
strict scrutiny because of the right to travel penalty analysis, but the
court of appeals rejected strict scrutiny and invoked the time-honored
rationality test applied to zoning cases. The district court found that
the essence of the plan was to keep people out, whereas the court of
appeals decided that the plan was reasonably designed to achieve a
temporary planning respite from the strains of community growth.
201. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See notes 50, 52, and 135-36 and accompanying text
supra.
202. 522 F.2d at 906-07 n.13.
203. 522 F.2d at 908-09.
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The extensive findings of fact made by the district court, which
could only be set aside by the court of appeals if found to be clearly
erroneous, 20 4 revolved around the central theory that the plan excluded
substantial numbers of people. These facts were important not only
for the right to travel issue, but also addressed the due process con-
siderations of whether the zoning measure was reasonable under the
circumstances to achieve some legitimate objective of the municipal
police power. The district court utilized the facts to focus on the
means and effect of the Petaluma plan; the court of appeals empha-
sized traditionally legitimate municipal purposes.
The district court did address Petaluma's major justifications for
enacting a growth-restricting plan and found them all to be without
merit. Discussing the city's contention that sewage treatment facilities
and water supply were inadequate, the court stated: "The city's refer-
ence to such alleged inadequacies is no more than an excuse intended
to justify the 'Petaluma Plan' after its adoption. 205  Specifically, the
court found that the city had purposefully planned the expansion of city
services to accommodate an optimum population of only 55,000 by
1990, as opposed to the 1962 General Plan projection of 77,000 by
1985. City officials had contracted for only enough water and addi-
tional sewage capacity, according to the district judge, to meet
the artificially restrained population under the plan's limit of 500
subdivision units per year. Rather than justifications for restricting
growth, sewage capacity and water supply problems were self-fulfill-
ing prophecies designed to support the plan's overt limits on city ex-
pansion. Under either a rationality test or the strict scrutiny test actual-
ly applied, the city's contentions of infrastructural incapacity would not
justify its plan. 206
The court of appeals did not address the district court's findings
of fact, but rather focused on the validity of Petaluma's desire to pre-
serve its small town character. Finding no constitutional impediments
to prevent a city from enacting a growth-restricting plan, the court
relied on Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills to declare that preservation
of small town character was within the auspices of the police power.
Significantly, the court of appeals did not distinguish the towns of
Belle Terre and Los Altos Hills, which were relatively sedate communi-
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
205. 375 F. Supp. at 577.
206. If the municipal concern over adequately providing public services were well-
founded, however, restrictions on the sequence and number of new dwellings could more
readily be upheld. See Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.
2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Note, Phased
Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 585 (1974). See also notes 164-81 and accompanying text supra.
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ties without substantial growth pressures, from Petaluma, which was a
"growth center" better able to accommodate new housing. Petaluma's
problems and city attitudes are more closely akin to those of Mount
Laurel and Ramapo--communities faced with significant demand
for new housing. The court warned, however, that its decision was
not a permanent endorsement of the plan's validity; rather, the crises
of housing inadequacies were better resolved by legislative action.20
The undesirable yet perhaps inevitable result of the Petaluma case
is that other cities in regional housing markets may interpret the
decision as granting carte blanche power to restrict growth. No inter-
pretation could be more dangerous. Petaluma is best viewed narrowly,
as upholding a temporary growth-restricting plan, without discrimina-
tory purpose or effect, whose valid objective of preserving town atmos-
phere outweighed the restrictions on personal mobility. Other cities
cannot assume that what Petaluma may enact for five years will be valid
for all communities. Courts should apply a battery of considerations
for determining the validity of future growth-restricting plans.
VII. Considerations for Evaluating the Validity
of Growth-Restricting Plans
Essential to any policy pursued in a complex society are plans that
take into account all possible contingencies and maintain the flexibility
to adapt when new factors are encountered. Incumbent on those who
formulate such plans is the necessity to articulate the desired ends and
to diligently research the possible means for achieving those ends.
The presumption of validity that attaches to legislative enactments is
largely derived from such a philosophy. Legislation is accorded the
presumption because it is assumed that the legislature has reasonably
arrived at its decision via an informed .analysis of the alternatives.
Courts usually do not judge the wisdom of enactments because they
assume that the legislature has done so. However, as has been noted,
legislatures do not always act from an informed posture, nor can they
always be expected to act in a comprehensive manner. Logically, dif-
ferent standards of judicial review should be applied depending on the
nature of the legislature. Pursuant to the belief that land use policies
are often formulated without adequate planning and research, and are
adjudicated without differentiation between the types of legislatures in-
volved, this note suggests methods by which local legislatures may enact
207. "The controversy stirred up by the present litigation, as indicated by the num-
ber and variety of amicd on each side, and the complex economic, political, and social
factors involved in this case are compelling evidence that resolution of the important
housing and environmental issues raised here is exclusively the domain of the legislature."
522 F.2d at 909 n.17.
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doctrinally sound legislation and standards by which the courts may
adjudicate the validity of such legislation.
1. Each municipality should clearly define and articulate its present
desired objectives.
A common feature of legislation that reaches the courts is the lack
of a clearly stated purpose. In such cases the judiciary must often
guess the legislative purpose and adjudicate pursuant to such a sup-
position. While often this works in favor of sustaining the questioned
legislation, particularly where the courts adjudicate pursuant to a
rational basis analysis, the underlying motivation of the legislation is
frequently impermissible and the legislation should be invalidated. A
clearly defined statement of policy thus permits future adjudication on
the merits. Moreover, a clearly articulated policy statement permits:
(a) evaluation by all concerned (citizens, legislators, and judges)
as to whether the ends articulated are clearly the objectives de-
sired;
(b) evaluation of whether the ends as stated are reasonable; and
(c) determination of the best means available to achieve the
stated goals.
2. Evaluate the reasonableness of the ends.
The desire of a municipality to preserve its small town character
is largely incongruous with the desire to achieve a strong industrial-
commercial tax base. Similarly, a rapidly-expanding city's desire to
slow its present rate of growth does not necessarily justify setting pop-
ulation limits and refusing to expand public facilities. The end cannot
be pursued merely because it is desirable. Rather, the objectives to
be attained must be evaluated in terms of the:
(a) geographic location of the community;
(b) past history of growth within the municipality;
(c) type of growth that has historically prevailed within the city
(e.g., commercial growth, multi-dwelling developments, low in-
come housing developments, subdivision developments);
(d) prospects for future growth within the municipality;
(e) burdens that will be imposed on neighboring communities; and
(f) benefits derived from neighboring communities.
3. Determine the best means to achieve the stated objectives.
Apparent from the discussion of the current state of land use af-
fairs is the fact that communities are frequently not the isolated towns
and boroughs of mid-twentieth century America. Therefore, should
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thi city's objectives be reasonable, it must still choose the best possible
means rather than merely the most expedient. In determining the
most appropriate means, the following factors should be considered:
(a) the geographic location of the community;
(b) the past history of growth and the current prospects for future
growth;
(c) the types of growth which have -historically been attained;
(d) the burdens which will be imposed on neighboring communi-
ties and the benefits that are derived from these communities;
(e) the current carrying capacity of the city and the ability of the
city to expand this capacity (for example, infrastructural capacity
such as ability to absorb waste and to supply water); and
(f) the existence of a regional planning authority.
Additionally, any growth-restricting plan should include the fol-
lowing components:
(a) detailed supporting findings of municipal growth problems
and express objectives for limiting city expansion;
(b) a relatively short period -of growth restrictions to avoid
charges that the plan is unreasonable and arbitrary;
(c) a restricted growth rate that is not lower than the rate at
which the region is growing;
(d) extensive public involvement in formulating the development
policies;
(e) specific policies that provide for proportionate low and mid-
dle income housing to accommodate the area's needs;
(f) priority of residential control on a competitive basis, with
large developments having a significant impact on the city's
growth being subject to far greater control than construction on
single lots; and
(g) whenever possible, compliance with regional housing projec-
tions.
Conclusion
Perhaps it is unfortunate that cities can no longer be the sole
governors of their individual destinies. Because land is becoming a
scarce resource, however, many municipalities must sacrifice their his-
torical autonomy and formulate their land use polices in light of the
social realities that surround them. Should they be reluctant to do so,
it is incumbent upon the courts ,to impose such an obligation. Munici-
palities experiencing minimal population pressures, whose policies largely
do not affect neighboring communities, will have relatively few obliga-
tions imposed upon them. Those municipalities that are part of a larger
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housing market, who borrow from and lend size to neighboring com-
munities, necessarily will incur greater obligations.
Petaluma will not be the last city to utilize its zoning power to
restrict the rate at which new residents are housed. Some of the future
growth restricting plans will -undoubtedly be unreasonable and arbitrary,
falling under the constitutional prohibitions of the due process and
equal protection clauses. As in New York, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey, courts will find discriminatory zoning practices lurking behind
city land use policies. Still, local governments will continue to be the
main arena of land use policy formulation. Perhaps state legislatures
will decide to establish regional zoning authorities either to replace or
to augment the present local focus. But until that time the courts will
have to grapple with the conflicting desire of municipalities to control
the manner in which they grow and the desire of individuals to have
unrestricted access to comfortable communities. The conflicts are
numerous and defy easy solutions. While litigation of municipal ordi-
nances is one method of testing the bounds of zoning authority, incisive
policy formulation and planning procedure are necessary for reasonably
guiding municipal growth.
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